Who benefits from agricultural subsidies is an open question. Economic theory predicts the entire subsidy incidence should be on the farmland owners. Using a complementary set of policy quasi-experiments, I find that farmers who rent the land they cultivate capture 75 percent of the subsidy, leaving just 25 percent for landowners. This finding contradicts the prediction from neoclassical models. The standard prediction may not hold due to less than perfect competition in the farmland rental market; the share captured by landowners increases with local measures of competitiveness in the farmland rental market.
Introduction
The primary goal of U.S. agricultural policy over the past century has been to increase farmers' income. Since 1973, direct payments to agricultural producers have been a vital instrument for supporting that goal.
1 Whether agricultural subsidies actually benefit farmers, however, is an open question. Non-farmers, individuals who do not currently farm any land, own and rent out nearly half of all farmland in the United States. Standard economic theory predicts that subsidies accrue entirely to land owners. Agricultural subsidies may not benefit farmers if non-farmer landlords are able to adjust rental rates to capture the subsidies paid to agricultural producers.
In the United States, agricultural subsidies are a significant transfer program. The standard model of agricultural subsidy incidence predicts that, due to the extremely inelastic supply of agricultural land, landowners receive the entire benefit of the subsidy. This model is widely used by economists to explain the effects of agricultural subsidies (e.g., Schultze, 1971; Schmitz and Just, 2002) . 3 According to this model, non-farmers, who own 94 percent of rented farmland and 42 percent of all U.S. farmland, reap a substantial share of the benefits from agricultural subsidies.
Surprisingly little evidence substantiates this model. In spite of a large literature examining the capitalization of subsidies into farmland values, the proportion of the marginal subsidy dollar captured by landowners remains unknown. Rosine and Helmberger (1974) attempt to address this question by simulating producer surplus with and without agricultural policy. They conclude that 92 cents of every dollar generated by farm programs accrues to the landlord. However, fundamental aspects of their simulation model have been questioned (Gisser, 1993; Alston and James, 2002) , and modern farm programs, which began in 1973, differ from those examined by Rosine and Helmberger. Instead of estimating the subsidy incidence, the previous literature typically assumes full incidence on land and estimates either the elasticity of land value with respect to subsidies (Traill, 1982; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne, 1992) , the rate at which future subsidies are discounted (Weersink, et al., 1999; Lamb and Henderson, 2004) , or the proportion of land value attributable to subsidies (Featherstone and Baker, 1988; Herriges, et al., 1992) .
In contrast, I directly investigate the incidence of agricultural subsidies by examining the response of farmland rental rates and tenants' net returns to exogenous agricultural subsidy changes while accounting for several potential sources of bias (see Roberts et al., 2003, for early work in this area). By law, farm operators receive the subsidy directly. Under cash lease arrangements, tenants receive the subsidy check; landlords extract the subsidy to the extent that rental rates rise with the subsidy. Thus, landlord and tenant incidence are measured by the extent to which rental rates and net operating returns, respectively, rise with the marginal subsidy dollar. In this paper I test the standard theory that landlords capture the full subsidy by testing whether rental rates rise dollar-for-dollar with subsidies and whether subsidies do not affect tenants' net returns.
As per-period prices, farmland rental rates respond primarily to innovations in expected returns in the current period, including exogenous policy-induced subsidy changes. Three policy changes provide the exogenous subsidy variation this paper uses to estimate the landlord-tenant division of the subsidy dollar. First, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act altered the relative subsidy rate among crops, resulting in subsidy variation due to historic crop choice rather than current behavior. Another source of bias may arise when the relevant subsidy measure, the expected subsidy when rental rates are set, is unavailable to the analyst. Prior to the 1996 FAIR Act, subsidy rates depended on post-harvest commodity prices, which were unknown when rental agreements were made in the spring. The difference between the realized subsidy used in the analysis and the expected subsidy considered when setting rental rates, i.e., the "expectation error," results in measurement error-style attenuation bias. The FAIR Act solves this problem by divorcing subsidies from commodity prices, making subsidies knowable by tenants and landlords when setting rental rates. I use the post-FAIR Act subsidy as an instrumental variable to address the expectation error problem.
Contrary to the standard model's predictions, this paper finds that only 20 to 25 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar are reflected in increased rental rates, whereas tenant net returns rise by 70 to 75 cents. Accounting for nearly the full subsidy dollar with these two largely independent estimates provides confidence in an approximately 25/75 landlord-tenant split of the marginal subsidy dollar.
Although previous research assumed full subsidy incidence on the landowner, characteristics of the farmland market, such as imperfect competition and social norms, suggest why this may not be the case. Farm consolidation and growth results in fewer tenants who may enjoy increasing market power in the farmland rental market. Landlords, who forgo the use value of the land without a tenant, may implicitly share the subsidy to attract tenants. I test this possibility using measures of rental market concentration and demonstrate that the landlord's incidence increases when the rental market becomes more competitive. Social norms and fairness also might play an important role in the division of the subsidy dollar.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the institutional facts about the farmland rental market and subsidy policy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy employed in this investigation, emphasizing the identifying assumptions. Section 5 presents the incidence on landlords and tenants and provides evidence of the robustness of the estimated incidence. Section 6 explores the short and long-run incidence. Section 7 examines possible explanations for the findings, and section 8 concludes.
Institutional Background

Overview of the farmland rental market
Renting farmland is a common practice in U.S. agriculture, where more than 45 percent of the 917-million farmland acres are rented (USDA, NASS 2001b) . A typical tenant rents 65 percent of the land he farms, paying either in cash or in shares of production. According to the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS), 5 60 percent of rented farmland is paid in cash, 24 percent in shares of production, and 11 percent in a cash/share combination. 6 In 1999, the average cash-rented acre went for $32. Subsidy recipients paid a slightly higher $36 per acre for the land they cash rented. In the United States, non-farmers own 5 The Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey is a follow-up survey to the Census of Agriculture conducted every 10 years. This survey asks questions of both tenants and land owners. 6 The remaining farmland is reported to be "rent free." 94 percent of the rented land, or 340 million acres-twice the size of Texas (USDA, NASS 2001b). The parties enter into the rental agreements early in the year, typically by March 1st.
Agricultural Subsidy Policy
The decade from 1992 -2002 saw three major agricultural subsidy policy changes, each providing a quasi-experiment that can be used to evaluate the incidence of agricultural subsidies.
Subsidies were calculated in a broadly consistent way throughout this period. to note that the subsidy is paid to the farm operator, and the program yield and program eligibility are specifically tied to an acre of land. As an acre changes ownership or receives new tenants, these parameters stay with the land, and the new operator receives the subsidy. As such, agricultural subsidies are factor-specific subsidies to land.
A. The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act was the first, and most significant, policy change during this decade. The FAIR Act changed relative subsidy 7 The exact calculation dropped the highest and lowest yields and averaged yields from the 3 remaining years.
rates, effectively redistributing subsidies according to the crop historically grown on the farm.
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It also divorced subsidies from commodity prices and established a seven-year schedule to phase out agricultural subsidies. Subsidies are paid to the farm operator after the harvest. Prior to 1996, the national subsidy rate depended on the commodity's price after harvest, i.e., s kt = s(p kt ).
When negotiating rental contracts in the spring, farmers and landlords knew the program yield and base acres associated with the rental property, but they were uncertain of the subsidy rate.
Hence, the rental rate was set conditional on the expected subsidy. Under the FAIR Act, the entire subsidy associated with the land was known in the spring, and rental rates could be set conditional on the actual subsidy.
B. Emergency subsidy legislation of 1998, 1999, and 2000
The second quasi-experiment that provides exogenous subsidy variation is a set of three "emergency" policy changes between fall 1998 and summer 2000, which were passed in response to dramatically falling commodity prices. The first of these policies unexpectedly increased 1998 subsidies by 50 percent. 9 Subsequently, the 1999 and 2000 legislation doubled subsidies. In terms of equation (1), these policies affected the scaling factor δ kt . The analysis below focuses on the impact of subsidies in 1999, the first year farmers could have expected additional subsidies in the face of low commodity prices. This policy change also provides the opportunity to capture the immediate effect of unanticipated subsidies. 
Data
The primary data source is the U.S. Census of Agriculture, a quinquennial census of those who produce at least $1,000 of agricultural goods. 10 The Census of Agriculture contains 10 These data are confidential micro files accessed under an agreement with the USDA Economic Research Service and the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The data are available at NASS in Washington, farm-level production information, information on the business structure of the operation, and demographic information on the primary operator. In addition, the Census employs a stratified sampling procedure to select a subset of farms from which it collects detailed financial information, such as variable expenditures, land values, and revenue. I construct the sample for the final analysis by limiting the sample to farms that report paying cash rent in both years. 12 The summary statistics of the final analysis sample, contained in the last two columns of table 1, reveal that the final analysis sample is representative of the population of cash renters. The only substantial difference between the population of cash renters and my sample is in the mean rental rate, reflecting the presence of large outliers in the population; note that the median rental rates, reported in brackets, are very similar between the sample and the population. The final analysis sample consists of 59,934 farms observed over two years.
Sample Selection Bias
Farms used in the final analysis reported paying cash rent in both 1992 and 1997. This poses a problem if the propensity to rent farmland in 1997 is influence by the 1996 policy change. For example, this source of endogeneity could bias the incidence estimate downward if farms experiencing a high subsidy pass-through stopped renting, but those experiencing low rental-rate incidence continue to rent. I investigate the potential sample selection bias using a Heckman selection model. The first stage includes both characteristics of the land and characteristics of the farmer, such as age and principal occupation, which likely influence the propensity to rent land. 13 The second stage excludes the demographic characteristics of the farmer. Although the farmer's characteristics likely influence the decision to rent, the rental rate is primarily determined by the characteristics of the land. The results of this analysis are 12 All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentile to limit the influence of outliers. Non-negative variables are only winsorized at the 99 th percentile.
reported in appendix table A1. Based on the exclusion restrictions, the likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the error terms from the selection and regression equations are uncorrelated. 14 The propensity to cash rent in both years appears unrelated to the subsidy.
Furthermore, the incidence estimate remains the same as the values reported below, demonstrating its robustness to this specification.
Variable Creation
A. Dependent Variable
The Census of Agriculture does not report the per-acre rental rate. Respondents, however, do report the total amount paid in cash rent. The total acres rented on a cash, share, or free basis also are reported. From these two variables, I create the per-acre rental rate by dividing total cash rent by total acres rented. Admittedly, the resulting rental rate will be too small for farms that cash rent part of the land and share rent another part. 15 As long as this measurement error in the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the regressors, only the intercept will be confounded. If, however, the measurement error is correlated with the magnitude of government payments, the estimated effect of government payments on rental rates will be biased. Evidence from the 1999 AELOS demonstrates that if a bias exists, it is likely to be slightly positive.
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B. Independent Variables
The subsidy variable is constructed from the reported government payments variables.
Every agricultural producer is asked to report the "total amount received for participation in federal farm programs." Producers are asked to report both total payments received and payments received from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP The remaining covariates employed below are sales revenue per acre, variable production expenditures per acre, the natural log of farm size, proportion of acres irrigated, proportion of acres in pasture, proportion of sales revenue in 19 commodity categories, and yields of the subsidized crops and soybeans. These were constructed directly from variables contained in the Census of Agriculture.
Empirical Strategy -Identification
Here I lay out the obstacles that must be overcome to identify the effect of government subsidies on farmland rental rates. First, unobserved productivity factors confound the subsidyrental rate relationship. Second, expectation error attenuates the estimate. After setting out a fixed-effect estimation equation to address the first concern, I detail the instrumental variables procedure necessary to overcome attenuation bias in the econometric model.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
The econometrician cannot observe many farm characteristics that influence both subsidies and farmland rental rates. Among these are soil properties and farmer skill, which positively affect subsidies through the program yield parameter in equation (1). The positive correlation between government payments and the time-invariant unobserved factors that influence productivity will upwardly bias the estimated effect of subsidies on rental rates.
Transient shocks, such as drought or pests, also may affect rental rates and government subsidies. Farm and time-varying county fixed effects address these sources of bias. The main estimation equation is (2)
where r ijt is the average rental rate for farm i in county j and year t. The per-acre subsidy expected by the farm operator in the spring, when rental contracts are negotiated, is g* it , and f i is the fixed effect for farm i. The parameter C jt is a time-varying county effect that allows for shocks, such as weather or pests, that impact all farms within the county. X it is a vector of observable covariates comprised of sales revenue, expenditure, production yield of the seven subsidized crops and soybeans, the share of sales revenue for 19 commodity groups, proportion of acres irrigated, proportion of acres in pasture, and farm size.
The estimating equation used in this study is obtained from equation (2) by first differencing the data to absorb the farm effect, resulting in
Expectation Error
The remaining problem to be addressed is expectation error. Rental rates are set in the spring according to expected receipts after harvest, including expected subsidy payments.
Expectation error causes attenuation bias. Actual government payments will equal the expected government payment and an expectation error,
. , implies that substituting realized government payments, g it , for the expected subsidies in equation (2) has the same effect as classical errors in variables, namely attenuation bias.
Cov g it
The 1996 FAIR Act reduces the complexity of the problem by eliminating expectation error in 1997. Recall that in 1996 the subsidy rates were exogenously predetermined for the next seven years. Because of this feature of the legislation, in 1997 expected subsidies equaled actual subsidies, g* i97 = g i97 .
Substituting for expected subsidies in equation (2) and first differencing results in
An instrumental variables strategy may overcome the attenuation bias induced by the expectation error. Instruments that address the bias due to expectation error should be correlated with the deterministic component of the subsidy (program yield and base acres) and uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic component (the 1992 subsidy rate). As illustrated in equation (1), the 1997 subsidy is a known, deterministic function of the underlying program parameters that also determined the 1992 subsidy. Inasmuch as the farm-level program parameters remain unchanged between 1992 and 1997, the deterministic component of the 1997 subsidy level will be highly correlated with the deterministic component of the 1992-1997 subsidy change. Thus the 1997 subsidy level will be a good instrument if the subsidy shock in 1992 contained no information for the expected subsidy in 1997, a reasonable assumption.
Estimation and Results
Main Results
A. Subsidy Incidence on the Landlord
The approach taken by this paper has the advantage of controlling for unobserved characteristics of the farm, such as the operator's entrepreneurial skill and the productivity of the land, that confound the subsidy's effect. I illustrate the insight gained from this approach by first ignoring the panel nature of the data. As reported in the first column of Since the expectation error depicted in equation ( ′ 3 ) attenuates the estimate, the fixed effects estimate may be too low. I address possible attenuation bias by instrumenting for the subsidy change with the 1997 subsidy level. As noted above, the permanent components of the subsidy will ensure correlation between the subsidy level and its change, and the surety of 1997 subsidy payments alleviates expectation error concerns regarding the instrument. 
B. Subsidy Incidence on the Tenant
Standard theory suggests that if the supply of variable inputs is perfectly elastic, the remaining 79 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar will accrue to the tenant. I estimate the tenant's incidence by replacing the rental rate in equation (3) with per-acre net returns, calculated as total revenue less variable costs divided by total farmland acres. For the reasons listed above, namely unobserved heterogeneity and the substantial importance of local production shocks, the specification remains the same. Since net returns are realized after the subsidy payment, expectation error is not a concern, and I do not instrument for the subsidy variable.
The coefficient on government payments from this regression, reported in table 2 column 5, is 0.80 with a robust standard error equal to 0.059. Recall that renters own about a third of the land they farm and consequently receive the entire subsidy dollar on those acres. Accounting for this in the 0.80 net returns incidence implies that tenants receive about 70 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar on rented land. 20 In other words, nearly the entire subsidy dollar on a rented acre of land can be accounted for as either a 21-cent increase in the rental rate or a 70-cent increase in the tenant's net returns. Accounting for nearly the entire subsidy dollar demonstrates that measurement error is an unlikely cause of the remarkably low rental rate incidence estimate.
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Ultimately, the landlord and tenant share roughly a 25/75 split of the marginal subsidy dollar.
The Heterogeneity of Subsidy Incidence across Regions and Farm Size
Regions within the U.S. differ substantially in the crops grown and the predominant lease contract type. Noting that each crop is subsidized separately, one might worry that the incidence differs according to crop and subsidy regime. Farm size might also influence the size of the incidence. For instance, perhaps large farms are better able to negotiate for lower rental rates, and they are driving the relatively low incidence.
I explore the robustness of the results by estimating the incidence separately for different self-reported subsidies per acre with the county-average subsidy per acre from administrative data reveals a nearly identical rental rate incidence estimate of 0.22 (s.e. 0.099, clustered at the county level). 22 The USDA has established 9 resource regions corresponding to predominant crop mix and farming practices, e.g., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/arms/resourceregions/resourceregions.htm and sales classes. Table 3 reports the share of total subsidies going to each resource region in 1997 and the incidence estimates. The rental rate incidence point estimates in column 2 lie between 0.16 and 0.48 for five of the nine resource regions, while the rest are indistinguishable from zero. The Heartland region receives the greatest share of subsidies, 38.2 percent, and has incidence estimates very similar to those found in the main analysis: a 0.32 rental rate incidence and a 0.81 incidence on tenants' net returns. The Eastern Uplands region has the highest rental rates incidence estimate, 0.48, but receives the smallest share of total subsidies, just 1.7 percent.
As reported in column 3 of table 3, six of the nine net returns incidence estimates lie within 0.1 of the main estimate.
The first column of table 4 reports that when estimated across sales classes, the rental rate incidence estimates cluster around the main result, ranging from 0.06 to 0.32. The tenants' net returns incidence estimates, reported in table 4 column 2, range from 0.71 to 1.09, except for the statistically insignificant estimate in the lowest sales class. The uniformity of incidence estimates spatially and across farm size gives further confidence in a 25/75 incidence split.
Further Evidence
A. Short-run Response: Emergency Legislation in 1998 and 1999
The surprisingly low rental rates incidence might result from landlords preemptively adjusting rental rates in anticipation of the 1996 policy change. The emergency legislation passed in 1998 and 1999 provides a unique opportunity to observe the short run effect of unanticipated subsidies on farmland rental rates. I investigate this using the 1999 AELOS, which contains financial information on a sample of 26,553 farms. I create a dataset of the [1997] [1998] [1999] change by merging these data with the 1997 Census of Agriculture. I estimate equation (3') using data from the resulting 5,587 farms. 24 The 1999 AELOS provides data on total government payments. However, according to administrative data, in 1999 land subsidies accounted for only half of government payments. I address this measurement error with a second instrument, derived from administrative data: the county-level average subsidy per acre. This IV strategy precludes the use of time-varying county effects in the estimation. However, since rental rates are set prior to, and independently of, local shocks, the model may not be misspecified by omitting the time-varying county effect. Table 5 reports the rental rate incidence estimate in the first column. Accounting for the measurement error results in a rental rate incidence estimate of 0.34, higher than that found in the main analysis, but still statistically (and substantially) less than 1. The second column of table 5 reports the subsidy coefficient in the net returns regression. Because of the importance of local production shocks in determining net returns, this specification continues to include time-varying county effects rather than use the county-level instrument to correct for measurement error. At 0.55, the estimated incidence on the tenant is similar to that found in the main analysis although somewhat attenuated, potentially due to measurement error or rents extracted in the short-run by other input providers.
B. Long-run Response: The Food Security Reform Act of 2002
Over time rental rates may adjust to more fully reflect the subsidy change. Columns 3 and 4 of table 5 report the results of this investigation. In addition to the amount of land-specific subsidies, upon which this paper is focused, the ARMS data provide information on loan deficiency payments, a production subsidy that first received widespread use in 1998. The first row of table 5 reveals the long-run incidence estimates corresponding to landspecific subsidies, while the second row controls for the effect of production subsidies. Column 3 reports a rental rate incidence estimate of 0.26 from the IV fixed effects specification. 25 The fourth column reports an estimate of 0.904. Using the formula in footnote 19 to account for farmland owned by the producer, this implies a tenant incidence of 0.86. 25 The Shea's partial R 2 from the first stage is 0.15 with an F-statistics of 120.
The standard caveats of the efficacy of fixed effects in a long difference of dynamic businesses apply here. Unobserved, time-varying heterogeneity remains unaccounted for, and the relatively small sample size reduces the power to discern the incidence. In spite of this, the incidence estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that the subsidy incidence does not substantively change in the medium to long-run.
Potential Explanations
Conventional wisdom holds that competitive farmland markets enable landlords to extract the entire marginal subsidy dollar, resulting in perfect subsidy incidence on farmland.
The less than full subsidy incidence found here warrants reconsideration of the fundamental assumptions. This section considers possible exceptions to the underlying assumptions of the farmland incidence model. I examine the role of competition in the less-than-perfect incidence finding and suggest the possible role of social norms.
Imperfectly competitive rental markets may play a role in these findings. Although landlords potentially could receive the subsidy on unrented, idle land, without a tenant, they would forgo the use-value of the land. 26 Landlords may have low reservation rents since agricultural land has few alternatives outside farming. In a market with many landlords and few renters, the landlords may implicitly share the subsidy dollar in an attempt to attract tenants.
To examine the hypothesis that rental market concentration affects the landlord's ability to extract the subsidy, I interact the farm-level subsidy with a county-level rental market concentration measure and include it in the main specification. I measure rental market concentration with two Herfindahl indices. One index defines market share over total county 26 Prior to the 1996 FAIR Act landlords could not directly receive subsidies on idle, unrented land. 27, 28
The effect of market concentration on rental rate incidence is reported in table 6. Column 2 reports how the incidence changes as rental market concentration varies. A 0.01 increase in the expenditure Herfindahl causes the incidence to fall by 0.035, and a 0.01 increase in the acreage Herfindahl leads to a 0.11 drop in the incidence. These estimates imply a 0.02-0.05 fall in the rental rate incidence due to average concentration growth between 1992 and 1997. Column 1 reports the incidence as the market approaches perfect competition. The incidence estimate increases substantially, approaching 0.34, when concentration, as measured by the acreage Herfindahl, goes to zero. Incidence increases to 0.29 as the expenditure Herfindahl goes to zero.
Imperfectly competitive rental markets appear to play a role in the lower-than-expected rental rate incidence.
Social norms, such as custom, trust, and fairness, also may play a role in the incidence.
Custom, which affects the structure of farmland rental contracts (Young and Burke, 2001) , might limit landlords' ability to extract rent. Tenant-landlord relationships are typically long term, 27 In the analysis, where the Herfindahls are averaged over tenants rather than counties, the mean ( allowing trust to play a role. 29 Robison et al. (2001) report that farmland sales prices are 6-7 percent lower when there is trust between the buyer and the seller. Fairness also provides a possible explanation for these findings. 30 Similar to the findings from ultimatum games in the lab (Guth et al, 1982) , landlords may "return" a positive amount of the subsidy to the tenant due to a sense of fairness.
Conclusion
This paper examines the proportion of the marginal subsidy dollar captured by farmland owners. Using a nationally representative panel of farms to account for unobserved heterogeneity and exploiting exogenous subsidy variation caused by legislative changes to identify the effect of subsidies on rental rates and farmer net returns, the analysis demonstrates that landlords capture about one-fifth of the marginal subsidy dollar through higher rental rates.
Seventy of the remaining 80 cents are accounted for in the tenant's net returns. The remaining 10 cents may be extracted by other input providers or may be lost due to measurement error.
The approximately 25/75 landlord-tenant subsidy split holds across farm sizes and across regions in the U.S. The same pattern holds immediately following a subsidy change and in the medium to long-run.
Ultimately, farm policy appears to accomplish its stated purpose to increase farmers'
income. This effect occurs directly, rather than indirectly through increased asset values, thereby benefitting all farmers, tenants and owner-operators alike. According to the 1996 Agricultural
Resource Management Survey, 46 percent of subsidized acres are rented. Considering that 94 29 Allen and Lueck report an 11.5-year average tenant-landlord relationship in Nebraska and South Dakota. In
Illinois, Sotomayer, Ellinger, and Barry (2000) report the mean tenant-landlord relationship to be 14.4 years.
30 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possible explanation.
percent of landlords are not farmers, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that only about 9 percent of farmland subsidies leave the agricultural sector.
This paper speaks more generally about the capitalization of location-specific policy effects into land values. Standard economic theory predicts that location-specific policy effects are capitalized into land values through competitive land markets. Relying on this theory, researchers have estimated the value of many non-market goods, e.g., the value of clean air (Greenstone and Chay, 2005) and health risks (Davis, 2004) . However, this paper's findings suggest that the standard assumptions may not always apply. Imperfect farmland rental markets play a role in the low incidence of subsidies on landlords. This finding needs to be explored in other settings through careful attention to institutional details and the competitive environment. Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The incidence is estimated with the IV fixed effects specification outlined in section 4. * indicates significance at 90th percentile. ** indicates significance at 95th percentile. *** indicates significance at 99th percentile. Table 2 notes for sample and covariates. The dependent variable is the cash rental rate. The estimates are obtained from an IV fixed effects specification similar to that outlined in section 4. The instruments are the per-acre subsidies in 1997 and the per-acre subsidies in 1997
Appendix
interacted with the measure of rental market concentration. The Herfindahl indexes treat market share as a farm's proportion of total rental expenditure in the county and as a farm's proportion of the total acres rented in the county. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 95th percentile. *** indicates significance at the 99th percentile.
